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FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE, BUT HOW ABOUT A RECESSION?
JEREMY ARKES and YU-CHU SHEN∗
In light of the current economic crisis, we estimate hazard models of divorce to
determine how state and national unemployment rates affect the likelihood of a divorce
or separation. With data in the United States over the 1978–2008 period from the 1979
NLSY, we find some evidence indicating that a higher unemployment rate increases the
risk of a marriage ending for couples in years 6–10 of marriage (suggesting counter-
cyclical divorce/separation probabilities) but has no significant effect for couples in
years 1–5 of marriage and those married longer than 10 years. The estimates are
generally stronger in magnitude when using national instead of state unemployment
rates and when considering just divorces rather than the first observed divorce or
separation. (JEL J12)
I. INTRODUCTION
Roughly half of all children see their par-
ents divorce by age 18 (Fagan and Rector 2000).
This is particularly disturbing when considering
the poor outcomes on children’s academic per-
formance and psycho-social adjustment (Amato
2001; Amato and Keith 1991) and the large
costs to society (Scafidi 1998) associated with
a parental divorce.
Historically, weak economic periods have
been thought to increase the likelihood of fam-
ilies divorcing. Some anecdotal evidence in the
popular press from the current economic crisis,
however, paints an ambiguous picture. John-
son (2008) suggests that couples are staying
together in the Great Recession because they
cannot afford to divorce. However, Stockdale,
Sauter, and Alazaraki (2011) argue that the weak
economic conditions of many southern states
represent the driving force behind the divorce
rate being higher in these southern states than
other states.
Theoretically, either effect is possible. Given
the high cost of divorce (from court costs and
needing to fund separate residences), a weak
economy could reduce the number of divorces.
∗We would like to thank the anonymous referees for their
comments.
Arkes: Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93940. Phone 1-831-
656-2646, Fax 1-831-656-7633, E-mail arkes@nps.edu
Shen: Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93940. Phone 1-831-
656-2951, Fax 1-831-656-7633, E-mail yshen@nps.edu
At the same time, a weak economy could
increase divorces because of financial strain
causing marital tension and perhaps because
expectations about future economic prospects
change, which could reduce the value of the
marriage for some.
Understanding how the strength of the econ-
omy affects the likelihood of divorces is impor-
tant for several reasons. First, divorces lead to
increases in poverty (Page and Stevens 2004)
and more children in single-parent households,
which much research has found to negatively
affect several outcomes for children (Amato
2001). Thus, projections about funds needed
for social services could be improved with a
more accurate understanding of how the econ-
omy affects the divorce rate. Second, there
has been a growing literature of attempts to
capture the full social cost and benefits of
recessions. The evidence on some outcomes
have been mixed—such as for alcohol (Dee
2001; Ruhm 1995). But there is strong evidence
that a weak economy leads to increased crime
(Arvanites and Defina 2006) and increased drug
and cigarette use among teenagers and young
adults (Arkes 2011, 2012). Capturing the effect
of the economy on divorce likelihood con-
tributes to the accounting of the social costs of
recessions.
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There have been several recent studies on
how the economy affects the likelihood of
divorce. Most of these studies used aggregate
state-level data and estimated linear models for
the divorce rate with state and year fixed effects
(Amato and Beattie 2011; Chowdhury 2013;
Hellerstein and Morrill 2011; Schaller 2012). In
contrast, two studies used individual-level data
(Harknett and Schneider 2012; Roy 2011).
The most common finding has been pro-
cyclical divorces, with divorces being higher
with a lower unemployment rate (Hellerstein
and Morrill 2011; Schaller 2012) and higher
income (Chowdury 2013). However, there have
been some other studies with mixed evidence
of the cyclicality of divorces. Amato and Beat-
tie (2005) find counter-cyclical divorce rates
for 1960–1980—which is consistent with the
findings of South (1985) for the post-WWII
period through the late 1970s—and pro-cyclical
divorce rates for 1985–2005. Roy (2011), with
Australian data, finds both pro-cyclical and
counter-cyclical divorce rates, depending on the
use of divorce vs. the end of cohabitation
and the use of husband’s vs. wife’s predicted
unemployment. And, Harknett and Schneider
(2012) find no effects of the unemployment
rate.
One issue with all these studies is that they
use (or, at least have as primary results) mod-
els with current-year rather than lagged unem-
ployment rates. This could be problematic for
a few reasons. The current-year state unem-
ployment rates is likely long after the deci-
sion to divorce and long after the events lead-
ing up to that decision. But, more importantly,
there is the potential for reverse causation. An
increase in the divorce rate in a state makes
it easier for people who are leaving a mar-
riage and having trouble in finding a job to
move to another state with better economic
conditions, as they do not have to negotiate a
move with a spouse. This is especially prob-
lematic with aggregate data and could pro-
duce the negative correlation between the con-
current unemployment and divorce rates with-
out there being a true causal effect. Consistent
with this story, the few studies that, in sec-
ondary models, considered a lagged unemploy-
ment measure alone (not in the same model
as using the current unemployment rate) found
them to be more counter-cyclical—i.e., less
of a negative correlation (Amato and Beattie
2011; Roy 2011). Hellerstein and Morrill (2011)
and Schaller (2012) did include three lagged
unemployment rates along with the current-
year unemployment rate; the former found the
effects lost their significance, and the latter
found that the estimates on the current-year
unemployment rate remained significantly neg-
ative (pro-cyclical).
An important issue with the aggregate stud-
ies is that the divorce rate can change with
a changing composition of the state (or a
change in the at-risk population), without any
change in any couple’s underlying probability
of divorce. For example, Hellerstein and Mor-
rill (2011) use the population of the state as
the denominator in the divorce-rate calculation,
and Schaller (2012) uses the Current Popula-
tion Survey (CPS) of 60,000 households to esti-
mate the number of married women in a state.
Thus, their divorce rates would change from a
migration into or out of a state of married cou-
ples with a systematically different underlying
probability of divorce. Furthermore, a migra-
tion of single people would affect the denom-
inator for Hellerstein and Morrill (2011). And,
as Schaller (2012) notes, using the CPS makes
the denominator subject to potential sample-
size bias, particularly in small states. Using
individual-level data, however, has a stable at-
risk population.
With most of the prior studies using aggre-
gate data, none of them investigated whether
the effect of the economy might be different
for couples at different stages of the marriage.
It is possible that a weak economy could hurt
young marriages but have much less effect on
long-established marriages, which often have
survived previous recessions and other challeng-
ing times.
In this study, we estimate how changes
in the economy (proxied by state or national
unemployment rates) affect the probability of
a marriage ending in divorce. We contribute
to the literature on several fronts. First, we
use lagged unemployment rates in the pri-
mary models (rather than current unemploy-
ment rates) to address the endogeneity issue.
Second, we use individual data and a duration
model, which has not been estimated in any
published study. Using individual data to esti-
mate the relationship between marriage survival
and economic condition, as opposed to using
aggregate data as most previous studies have,
has the advantage of avoiding any bias from
the changing compositions of state populations
or changes in the at-risk population. The data
capture both the initial and end month of the
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marriage, which allows us to model marriage
duration. Third, we examine how the strength
of the economy affects divorce rates at dif-
ferent stages of marriage. In contrast with the
common finding from previous studies, we find
no evidence for pro-cyclical divorces. In addi-
tion, we find that divorces are indeed counter-
cyclical for couples in their 6th to 10th year of
marriage.
II. THEORY AND METHODS
A. Conceptual Framework
The theory underlying this analysis is based
on the simple dynamic model of marital con-
tinuation/dissolution used by Becker (1993),
Becker, Landes, and Michael (1977), Weiss
(1997), and Weiss and Willis (1997). In this
model, marriage is a partnership in which the
couple consumes goods together and makes
marital-specific investments (such as children
and property) that can, in theory, increase
the benefits of marriage. Part of the gains
from marriage comes from the division of
labor and increased productivity in the fam-
ily from specialization and combining into
one household. The expected gains from mar-
riage depend on the traits of the two part-
ners, such as temperament and earnings capac-
ity. But, those traits can change over time,
as well as the value of the alternative to
marriage.
The divorce-decision rule will depend on the
values in each period of the traits of each spouse
(e.g., earnings capacity and temperament), the
marital-specific investments (again, children and
property as the prime examples), the match
quality (which is mostly unobserved), and any
factors causing changes to these characteristics,
investments, and quality.
Many of the individual characteristics of the
husband and wife (such as earnings) and the
marital-specific investments are not exogenous,
as the commitment to the marriage could dic-
tate investments in children and property and,
particularly, the wife’s earnings capacity. How-
ever, the measure of the aggregate economy, if
properly lagged, should be purely exogenous.
One mechanism for how the economy would
affect the probability of divorce would come
through the economy’s effects on the husband’s
and wife’s employment outcomes and earnings
capacity. A weaker economy would decrease the
chances of employment for both, and with that,
would possibly be associated with lower earn-
ings. Lower earnings among either the husband
or wife could increase the risk of divorce by
increasing financial strain on the family. The
financial strain could elicit undesirable behav-
ior among one of the spouses, thereby increas-
ing marital tension. In addition, unemployment
for the husband or wife could convey negative
information on the person’s economic poten-
tial and contribution; and Charles and Stephens
(2004) find evidence suggesting that negative
information on a spouse’s economic poten-
tial is more important than financial losses
in contributing to divorce. Furthermore, hav-
ing lower earnings would make it more dif-
ficult for the couple to make marital-specific
investments (such as buying a home or tak-
ing vacations) that could increase the long-term
benefits of marriage and, perhaps, discourage
divorce (Becker, Landes, and Michael 1977).
On the basis of these mechanisms, a weaken-
ing economy would increase the probability of
divorce.
A counter-argument on the effects of the
wife’s earnings is that a reduction in the wife’s
earnings potential would reduce her indepen-
dence and increase the gains from marriage from
division of labor (Lehrer 2003). Some studies
have found that higher wife’s earnings were
associated with a higher probability of divorce,
so lower wife’s earnings would stabilize the
marriage (Heideman, Suhomlinova, and O’Rand
1998; Schoen et al. 2002). However, estimat-
ing the true effect would be difficult because
wife’s earnings would be highly endogenous,
as an unstable marriage would lead to wives
making efforts to become more economically
independent.
Other mechanisms could cause a weakening
economy to lead to a lower probability of
divorce. Divorces are costly, with most of those
costs coming from court expenses and having to
support two residences instead of one. A weaker
economy would then make it more difficult for a
married couple to absorb these costs of divorces.
The effects of the economy on a couple’s
probability of divorce could vary by the length
of marriage because the stability of the marriage
could change. And it is likely the case that
whether a weak economy affects the probability
of a divorce (either positively or negatively)
depends on the stability of the marriage and the
amount and type of marital-specific investments.
Research indicates that the first 5 years of
marriage is a high-risk period for divorces
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(Heideman, Suhomlinova, and O’Rand 1998).
At the same time, with fewer marital-specific
investments (such as a house and kids), perhaps
the financial strain from a lost job is not as
stressful for couples in their first 5 years of
marriage.
As couples are married longer, the sus-
ceptibility of the couple to economic factors
could increase or decrease. On average, mar-
ital satisfaction decreases from the beginning
of marriages (Gottman and Notarius 2002; Kar-
ney and Bradbury 1991; Kurdek 1999), so this
could cause marital stability to decrease. On
the other hand, more marital-specific invest-
ments could stabilize or destabilize the marriage.
For some couples, marital-specific investments
(such as children) could solidify a marriage,
as it binds them. However, in some cases, the
investments (such as a house) may destabilize a
marriage. For example, owning property could
increase stress for making payments, and that
stress would be exacerbated in a weak econ-
omy. And, while having children is often consid-
ered an investment that binds a couple, children
add financial stress, perhaps contributing to the
reductions in marital satisfaction associated with
having children (Twenge, Campbell, and Foster
2003).
Couples whose marriage survives a certain
length of time would have an inherent dura-
bility. These couples probably withstood earlier
risk periods, weak economic times, and other
difficulties. Thus, they may be less susceptible
to economic changes.
In summary, the strength of the economy
could affect a married couple’s decision to con-
tinue or dissolve a marriage through several
mechanisms as discussed above. And, these
mechanisms could vary based on the length
of the marriage. It is impossible to distinguish
between all the mechanisms due to the endo-
geneity of individual factors. Our goal is to
estimate the total effect of the economy, prox-
ied by the monthly state or national unemploy-
ment rate, on the marriage survival at different
stages of marriage, while controlling for the fac-
tors that are deemed important to the marriage
production.
B. Data
The data for this analysis come from the
NLSY-79, which started with 12,686 individ-
uals who were between 14 and 22 years old at
the time of the first interview in 1979. The sub-
sequent interviews were annual through 1994, at
which point they became biennial. We use data
through the 2008 round. The survey included
supplemental samples of military (which we
exclude due to having a small sample and not
having enough years of observation), minorities
(Blacks and Hispanics), and low-income non-
minorities. We apply sample weights to produce
a nationally representative sample (Table S1,
Supporting Information).
The NLSY-79 has very detailed informa-
tion on the actual year/month of all mar-
riages and other changes in marital status.
This allows us to estimate the survival mod-
els based on the timing of the divorce rela-
tive to anniversaries. In some cases, there is
just a divorce (without a separation) and in
other cases there is just a separation (without
a divorce). Reconciliations are not recorded in
the data. It is possible that some respondents
report the separation date as the divorce date
since the separation date is the time when they
consider the marriage to be over. Given the
uncertainty over how the divorce or separation
dates are reported, we use two separate sce-
narios: (1) analyses based on the first reported
divorce or separation marking the end of the
marriage and (2) analyses based on the first
reported divorce marking the end of the mar-
riage.
The specific dates given for the changes in
marital status allow us to take advantage of
monthly unemployment rates timed to the dates
of marriage for a couple and not have to rely
just on annual unemployment rates. The NLSY-
79 also has detailed demographic and family
factors, such as the couple’s educational status,
state of residence, and the number and ages of
children. The state information can be used to
match monthly state-level economic data.
For the measures of the economy, we use two
different types of unemployment rates obtained
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ web-
site (www.bls.gov/data). In one set of models,
we use monthly state unemployment rates. In
another set of models, we use monthly national
unemployment rates. The advantages of each are
described below.
C. Sample
From the 12,686 NLSY-79 respondents, we
first exclude 1,280 respondents (10.1%) who
were part of the military sub-sample, as they
were dropped from the NLSY-79 after the
1984 survey round. The sample then takes the
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8,050 respondents who had their first marriage
between 1978 (1 year before the first interview)
and 2007. Using 1978 as the earliest date
allows information on the husband’s and wife’s
education to be included for the first year of
marriage. Marriages originating in the prior
years would not have this information. We
exclude marriages occurring in 2008, as we
would not observe the completion of the first
year of marriage for these people, although we
still use observations from 2008 on whether
marriages ended.
We then create separate samples based on
the marriage ending with a divorce only or
the marriage ending with a divorce or sep-
aration, whichever comes first. After exclud-
ing those married for less than 1 year (as
they would not have a lagged unemploy-
ment rate during their marriage) and those
who were not in the United States in any
observed year of marriage or in the year
prior to the marriage (so that an unemploy-
ment prior to the marriage formation can be
calculated), we have 95,472 observations for
7,681 couples for the analysis on divorces, with
each observation for a given couple represent-
ing 1 year of marriage. And, we have 84,080
observations for 7,367 couples for the analy-
sis on divorces/separations. For the analysis on
divorces, 63.5% of couples were right-censored,
while 59.3 of couples were right-censored for
the divorce/separation analysis. All models are
weighted by the NLSY respondents’ original
1979 sample weights.
D. Empirical Models
Following the standard literature on causes
of divorce (Lillard and Waite 1993; Weiss and
Willis 1997), we analyze the hazard of a mar-
riage ending using a proportional hazard model.
It is semi-parametric, and thus, we do not have
to assume a priori whether the marriage sur-
vival rate has a positive or negative dependence
on time. Having data on the actual month/year
of the marriage and any divorce/separation (if
the marriage ends during the study period)
allows us to determine if the couple reaches
each anniversary, which allows us to use the
standard Cox proportional hazard model (Cox
1972).
In the proportional hazard framework, for
each couple we define a 1-year interval during
which we can observe marital status. A couple
enters the model on the day of their marriage
(denoted as t0). We would denote their subse-
quent wedding anniversaries as t1, t2, and so
on. Couples who were married during the study
period and stayed married at the end of the study
period are censored at the end.
In the econometric model, the hazard rate
that couple i ended their marriage given that
they were married up until a given anniversary
is described by the following hazard function,
λi (t):
Prob(couple i ended their marriage by anniversary
(1)
t |stayed married until anniversary t − 1)
= exp(β1URit−1 + β′2Xit + β′3Sit−2 + β′4Yit )
λ0(t)
where λ0(t) is the baseline hazard rate for
a divorce/separation for 0–12 months before
anniversary t ; URi,t−1, the 12-month average
unemployment rate for the year leading up
to anniversary t-1 (i.e., 13–24 months before
anniversary t); Xi,t , a vector of individual and
family characteristics as of anniversary t-1;
Si,t−2, a vector of state indicators as of anniver-
sary t-2 ; and Yi,t , a vector of year-group indi-
cators for anniversary t .
In essence, the model examines whether the
average unemployment rate in the 12 months
preceding anniversary t-1 affects the probabil-
ity of a divorce/separation in the (t-1, t) period,
given that the couple stayed married up to t-
1. See Figure A1 in the Appendix for a time-
line example of when we measure the outcome
and the unemployment rate. Note that we do
not use the unemployment rate for 0–12 months
before anniversary t because much of that would
occur after the divorce/separation—that is, on
average, those ending their marriage would do
so 6 months prior to the next anniversary, so
unemployment rates for 0–12 months prior to
the anniversary would partly reflect the econ-
omy after the divorce/separation decision is
reached. We use unemployment rates measured
over the 12-month period because it is prob-
ably not the strength of the economy at a
point in time that would affect a married cou-
ple, but rather the strength of the economy
over a longer period of time. The state indi-
cators, Si,t−2, are based on the state the cou-
ple lived in as of t-2, which is the beginning
of the 12-month period (in which the unem-
ployment rate is measured) preceding the year
of marriage leading to anniversary t . The state
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indicators control for differences in underly-
ing divorce/separation hazards across states that
may be incidentally correlated with the unem-
ployment rates. This will capture time-invariant
differences in divorce/separation rates across
states due to state policies/culture unrelated
to unemployment. Hardly any divorce policies
(e.g., unilateral divorce laws) changed during
our time of analysis, so state dummy vari-
ables should capture most of the state differ-
ences attributable to these policies. The year-
group indicators, Yit , capture differences in
divorce/separation rates for the period (more
details below).
For both methods of defining the end of the
marriage, there are four models. Model 1 uses
the unemployment rate for the state of resi-
dence of the couple at anniversary t-2 (i.e., the
year preceding the current year of marriage).
The state unemployment variables differ across
couples because of variation in marriage dates
and state of residence—if two couples from the
same state got married in the same year/month,
they would have identical values for the unem-
ployment rates.
Model 2 uses the equivalent of a spline func-
tion, in which we have the state unemployment
rates interacted with three group variables based
on the length of marriage: in years 1–5 of mar-
riage, in years 6–10, and in years 11 or more.
We had broken down the later years (beyond
10 years of marriage) in more detail, but there
was little difference between the estimates for
those groups and the sample gets smaller, so we
just grouped them for greater precision. Model
2 allows for an examination of whether unem-
ployment rate might have different effects on
a couple’s divorce/separation hazard depending
on the stage of their marriage. In this model, the
likelihood of a divorce/separation for couples in
the first 5 years of marriage is compared to that
for other couples in the first 5 years of marriage
facing different state unemployment rates; and
the same comparisons are made for the other
two stages of marriage.
Models 3 and 4 are the same as Models 1
and 2, but they use the national unemployment
rate instead of the state unemployment rate.
The national unemployment rate just varies
across couples based on the timing of the
anniversaries. The national unemployment rate
has advantages over the state unemployment
rate in that it is less subject to measurement
error and it represents the whole country, as
people can always move to an area with better
economic conditions. The drawback to using the
national unemployment rate is that there could
be incidental correlation of the unemployment
rate with cohort or period effects (from the time
at marriage or the year of analysis), which could
include national events such as campaigns to
strengthen marriages or tax changes affecting
marriage incentives. Controlling fully for the
time periods would take away all variation in
the national unemployment rate. Instead, we
address this by including the year-of-analysis
and year-of-marriage indicator variables in 3-
year groups.
Models 1–4 are first estimated based on
a marriage ending from a divorce and then
estimated again based on marriages ending in a
divorce or separation, whichever comes first. All
models have the standard errors clustered at the
state level, as is standard when using aggregate
data (Moulton 1990). In addition, the models
account for right-censoring.
E. Other Explanatory Variables
In terms of demographic characteristics that
might systematically affect divorce/separation
rates, some information is only available for
the NLSY-79 respondent, whereas other infor-
mation is available for the respondent and
sometimes his/her spouse. The information only
available for the respondent includes the respon-
dent’s race (we use indicators for being Black
and Hispanic), religion, attendance at religious
services, and the respondent’s percentile score
for the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT,
a measure of aptitude).
The information that is also available for the
spouse includes age at the time of marriage
and education. For age at the time of mar-
riage, we use indicators for 3-year age groups
to improve the precision of the estimates. For
education, we use non-mutually-exclusive indi-
cators for having a high school diploma and
a bachelor’s degree. For these variables that
are available for the spouse, we create separate
variables for the husband and wife so we can
examine whether certain factors are more impor-
tant for the husband or wife. We also include
a variable for whether the NLSY-79 respon-
dent is the husband or the wife, indicated by
the variable, “male.” The information on the
spouse’s age, high school diploma status, and
bachelor’s degree status were missing for about
7%, 8%, and 21% of the sample, respectively.
In such cases, we assign the following values
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for the spouse: an age where the husband is
2 years older than the wife (consistent with cur-
rent statistics), having a high school diploma,
and not having a bachelor’s degree. Further-
more, we include indicator variables for hav-
ing missing information on the age-at-marriage,
high school diploma, and bachelor’s degree for
both the husband and wife. The AFQT score
is missing for 5% of the sample, so we assign
the national median (50) and use an indica-
tor for missing AFQT. Finally, we include a
variable for the state unemployment rate in the
year leading up to the marriage to hold con-
stant the economic conditions at the time of
the marital formation. We exclude variables for
having kids and home ownership due to the
potential endogeneity of the decision to have
children.
As noted above, the model also includes
indicators for 3-year groups for the year of
marriage cohort and for the year of analy-
sis—for example, for the year of analysis,
evaluating whether the couple survived the
eighth year of marriage, the model controls for
what 3-year group the eighth anniversary fell
in (such as 1997–1999). It should be noted
that the year-of-marriage variables, the year-
of-analysis variables, and the age-at-marriage
variables are highly correlated with each other.
Thus, the estimates on them (which we do not
present) would be difficult to interpret, but they
should serve, together, as a good set of control
variables.
A notable set of variables we exclude is
for the actual employment outcomes for the
husband and wife. There are two reasons for
excluding these variables. First, these vari-
ables are endogenous (particularly the wife’s
employment, as discussed above), so includ-
ing them could cause biased estimates. Sec-
ond, we are interested in the total effect of
the economy rather than an effect after par-
tialling out the effects on individual employment
outcomes. The total effect will capture these
effects.
It is important to note that our analysis is
meant to estimate the effects of the economy on
marriage survival for the population of couples
who have already chosen to enter marriage. It is
possible that people do not enter marriage ran-
domly, and therefore their duration of marriage
would depend on the entry decision. However,
it would be difficult to find an instrument that
affects entry into marriage but not the divorce
likelihood. As our sample is already conditioned
TABLE 1














Husband has a bachelor’s degree 0.25 0.43
Wife has a bachelor’s degree 0.25 0.43
Husband has a high school diploma 0.89 0.31
Wife has a high school diploma 0.92 0.27
Husband’s age at marriage 25.75 5.16
Husband’s age at marriage squared 689.75 302.01
Wife’s age at marriage 23.82 4.74





AFQT percentile score divided by 10 5.18 2.80
Catholic 0.35 0.48
Baptist 0.21 0.41
Other Christian 0.29 0.45
Jewish 0.02 0.13
Other religion 0.10 0.30
In 1979, attended religious services at
least once per week
0.47 0.50
In 1979, attended religious services,
but less than once per week
0.36 0.48
Number of observations 95,472
Notes: These statistics are based on the models using
just divorces to mark the end of a marriage. The statistics
are based on sample weights.
on married couples and a very high propor-
tion of the population does get married (80%
of males and 86% of females, by age 40–44,
according to Census data), it is unlikely that
the non-randomness of the entry decision would
introduce bias in our estimated effect of the
economy. Nonetheless, we describe several sen-
sitivity analyses in the results section to address
this concern.
III. RESULTS
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for
the variables used in the model, other than
the missing-variable, year-of-marriage, year-of-
analysis, and state indicator variables. Figure 1
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FIGURE 1
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year of marriage
Kaplan-Meier survival estimate
Note: This figure was created in Stata.
shows the unadjusted survival probability of
marriage, based on marriages ending by divorce.
By 10 years of marriage, 28% of couples
have divorced. By 20 years, about 41% have
divorced. And by the end of our data at 30 years,
the likelihood of being divorced is almost 50%.
Note that the percentage of couples in our analy-
sis that divorce will be lower than these numbers
because most are censored long before reaching
29 years of marriage. The divorce rates vary by
the stage of marriage. For divorces alone, the
annual rates are 3.7% in the first 5 years, 2.8%
in years 6–10, and 1.9% after 10 years of mar-
riage. For divorces/separations, the annual rates
are 4.7% in the first 5 years of marriage, 3.1%
in years 6–10 of marriage, and 2.0% beyond
10 years of marriage.
Table 2 shows the coefficient estimates, stan-
dard errors, and hazard ratio estimates for Model
1 for both models based on divorces and based
on divorces/separations. The coefficient estimate
on the unemployment rate is positive and weakly
significant (p < .10) for the model for divorces
and negative and insignificant for the model for
divorces/separations. We will discuss the unem-
ployment in more detail when describing the
full set of models in Table 3. The unemploy-
ment rate in the year leading up to the marriage
had no effect.
As for other variables, having a high school
diploma has no significant effect on the haz-
ard of the marriage ending, but either spouse
having a bachelor’s degree significantly reduces
the hazard of the marriage ending by about
25% (p < .01). Being older at the time of mar-
riage (for the husband or wife) significantly
reduces the probability of the marriage end-
ing. Interestingly, relative to the NLSY respon-
dent being non-Black and non-Hispanic, Black
respondents have a significantly higher proba-
bility of a divorce/separation (p < .01), but a
negative and almost significant effect on the
probability of just a divorce. A higher AFQT
score of the NLSY respondent is associated with
a lower risk of divorce/separation (p < .01),
but not a divorce. Relative to those without
a religion, only Jewish respondents have sig-
nificantly different divorce/separation probabil-
ities (61% lower, p < .01). Attending religious
events less than once per week had a nega-
tive and significant effect on divorce probabili-
ties. For space considerations, we do not show
the coefficient estimates for the missing-value-
indicator variables and the year-of-marriage,
year-of-analysis, age-at-marriage variables, and
state. As mentioned earlier, there is high multi-
collinearity between many of these indicator
variables, so their purpose is just to serve as
control variables.
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TABLE 2
Cox Proportional Hazard Model Results on the Likelihood of a Marriage Ending: 1979–2008
Using “Divorces” as the End Using “Divorces and Separations”
of a Marriage as the End of a Marriage
B SE B Hazard ratio B SE B Hazard ratio
Unemployment rate variables
1-year-lagged state unemployment rate 0.033 0.020 1.034∗ −0.023 0.016 0.977
State average unemployment rate in year
preceding marriage
−0.004 0.014 0.996 −0.003 0.016 0.997
Couple characteristics
Husband has a bachelor’s degree −0.277 0.103 0.758∗∗∗ −0.264 0.075 0.768∗∗∗
Wife has a bachelor’s degree −0.269 0.097 0.764∗∗∗ −0.320 0.074 0.726∗∗∗
Husband has a high school diploma 0.004 0.101 1.004 −0.112 0.074 0.894
Wife has a high school diploma 0.096 0.113 1.101 −0.158 0.075 0.854∗∗
Husband’s age at marriage −0.140 0.028 0.870∗∗∗ −0.113 0.029 0.893∗∗∗
Husband’s age at marriage, squared 0.002 0.000 1.002∗∗∗ 0.002 0.000 1.002∗∗∗
Wife’s age at marriage −0.117 0.026 0.890∗∗∗ −0.121 0.025 0.886∗∗∗
Wife’s age at marriage, squared 0.001 0.000 1.001∗∗∗ 0.001 0.000 1.001∗∗∗
NLSY respondent characteristics
Black −0.122 0.079 0.885 0.263 0.071 1.301∗∗∗
Hispanic −0.394 0.097 0.674∗∗∗ −0.125 0.090 0.882
Male −0.117 0.072 0.889 −0.082 0.072 0.922
AFQT percentile score/10 −0.013 0.012 0.987 −0.031 0.011 0.970∗∗∗
Catholic −0.094 0.122 0.910 −0.231 0.126 0.794∗
Baptist −0.007 0.127 0.993 −0.071 0.134 0.931
Other Christian −0.074 0.118 0.929 −0.132 0.126 0.877
Jewish −0.854 0.352 0.426∗∗ −0.959 0.308 0.383∗∗∗
Other religion 0.097 0.125 1.102 −0.001 0.144 0.999
In 1979, attended religious at least once
per week
0.036 0.061 1.036 −0.012 0.057 0.988
In 1979, attended religious services, but
less than once per week
−0.127 0.077 0.881 −0.164 0.068 0.849∗∗
Number of observations 95,472 84,080
Notes: eB indicates the estimated hazard ratio. The models are weighted and also include state indicator variables, 3-
year-group-indicator variables for age-at-marriage, year-of-marriage, and year-of-analysis, and indicators for missing variables
for the AFQT scores, education variables and age at marriage. The excluded category for religion was “no religion,” and
the excluded category for religious-service attendance was “no attendance in the past year.” The models account for right-
censoring. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
∗p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01.
Table 3 presents the estimated hazard ratios
and standard errors of just the unemployment
rate variables for all models, for divorces in
the top panel and for divorces/separations in the
bottom panel. The results include a repeat of the
hazard ratios from Model 1 for both analyses
from Table 2.
In the top panel of Table 3, considering just
divorces, the estimate on the state unemploy-
ment rate is positive (0.034) but only weakly
significant in Model 1. In Model 3, the estimate
on the national unemployment rate is 0.102,
which is much more significant (p < .01). To
give perspective on the estimated effects of the
national unemployment rate, the average annual
divorce rate over the first 20 years of marriage
in our sample is 2.6%. If the odds increased by
10.2% then divorce probability each year would
increase to 2.9%. Thus, there is evidence that a
weaker economy leads to higher divorce rates.
However, as Models 2 and 4 show, this is not
the case for all couples. The state and national
unemployment rates have a significant effect on
the divorce probability for those in years 6–10
of marriage, but not for couples in the first
5 years of marriage or those married for more
than 10 years.
The bottom panel of Table 3 shows the
results from the same set of models, but based
on marriages ending in a divorce or separation.
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TABLE 3
Summary of the Effects of Unemployment Rates on the Hazard of Marriages Ending for All Models
Using State Using National
Unemployment Rates Unemployment Rates
Hazard Ratios (standard errors) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Using divorces as the end of a marriage
Unemployment rate 1.034∗ 1.102∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.041)
Unemployment rate × in years 1–5 of marriage 1.014 1.039
(0.030) (0.045)
Unemployment rate × in years 6–10 of marriage 1.079∗∗∗ 1.234∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.056)
Unemployment rate × in years 11+ of marriage 1.004 1.014
(0.036) (0.061)
Number of observations 95,472 95,472 95,472 95,472
Using a divorce or a separation as the end of a marriage
Unemployment rate 0.977 1.034
(0.016) (0.029)
Unemployment rate × in years 1–5 of marriage 0.963∗ 0.999
(0.020) (0.035)
Unemployment rate × in years 6–10 of marriage 1.006 1.121∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.043)
Unemployment rate × in years 11+ of marriage 0.984 0.983
(0.045) (0.067)
Number of observations 84,080 84,080 84,080 84,080
Note: The figures represent hazard ratios and standard errors in parentheses. The models also include all the variables
listed in Table 2 and the other variables indicated in the notes for Table 2. The models account for right-censoring. Standard
errors are clustered at the state level.
∗p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01.
There is no significant effect of the unemploy-
ment rate on the divorce/separation likelihood
for all couples (Models 1 and 3). But again,
in Model 4, using the national unemployment
rate, there is evidence that it is the couples in
years 6–10 of marriage who have an increased
likelihood of their marriage ending when the
economy is weak. The state unemployment rate,
in Model 3, had no significant effect for cou-
ples in years 6–10 of marriage, but did have a
weakly significant negative effect for those in
years 1–5 of marriage (p < .10).
In a sensitivity analysis, we estimated the
same sets of models stratified on year of mar-
riage: those married in 1978–1983 (a rela-
tively weak economic period) and those married
in 1984–1990 (a relatively strong economic
period). These models attempt to address
whether selection into marriage affects how sus-
ceptible the couples’ divorce likelihoods are to
economic cycles. The results are not presented
but are available in the online Appendix for
this article. While these models had less power
and thus had fewer statistically significant esti-
mates, the estimates are largely similar and are
not significantly different from each other. Thus,
the estimated effect of unemployment on mar-
riage survival is very stable when we stratified
based on the economic condition at the time of
marriage.
There are several potential limitations to
this study. First, we cannot be certain when
exactly a divorce decision was made. We use 1-
year-lagged unemployment rates to ensure that
the unemployment rate is measured prior to
the year in which the couple divorces. For
some people, the decision point may have been
even before that. However, based on the find-
ing of Bramlett and Mosher (2001) that 54%
and 75% of couples divorce by 12 months and
24 months after the initial separation, respec-
tively, we deemed this the best approach to
capture when most people would make such
decisions. Second, as mentioned earlier, respon-
dents may have taken the liberty of dating a
divorce at the time of separation or may have
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not bothered to report an initial separation. There
is, however, no reason to believe that any mis-
reporting is correlated with the strength of the
economy. Finally, it is possible that couples
would move to states with lower unemploy-
ment rates, and this could cause empirical prob-
lems. If a couple’s propensity to move to a
state with a lower unemployment rate is cor-
related with the stability of the marriage, then
the estimates may be biased. However, we are
not aware of literature showing this type of
movement.
IV. DISCUSSION
One motivating factor for this analysis is the
current economic crisis. If we wanted to know
how the crisis was affecting divorce/separation
rates, we cannot just look at whether there
are more divorces and separations, as cohort
effects, current-period effects, and demographic
shifts may also be affecting divorce rates. An
examination of relatively recent historical data,
however, should provide a good indication of
how this economic crisis is affecting marriage
stability.
We make two primary contributions in this
study. First, we make the argument that the
current-year unemployment rates could be endo-
genous and that lagged unemployment rates
should be used. Prior studies demonstrate that
estimates are more in the counter-cyclical direc-
tion when using the lagged unemployment rate.
Second, we estimate separate effects of the econ-
omy on the likelihood of divorce by the stage
of marriage. Third, our use of individual data
has the advantage over the use of aggregated
data (used in most previous studies) in that the
at-risk population is stable and not subject to
sampling error from surveys or migration into
or out of a state by single people—although
individual data is potentially subject to attrition
bias.
There is some evidence that the economy
affects the probability of divorce or separa-
tion for the whole sample, particularly when
using national unemployment rates. But, there
is much stronger evidence that those in years
6–10 of their marriage face an increased likeli-
hood of a marriage ending when the unemploy-
ment rate is higher—indicating counter-cyclical
divorces and separations. For the other stages
of marriage, there is no evidence of any sys-
temic relationship between the strength of the
economy and the probability of their marriage
ending.
This finding of counter-cyclical divorces for
those in years 6–10 of their marriage is con-
sistent with the time-series findings of South
(1985) and Amato and Beattie (2011) for analy-
ses through the late 1970s. However, the results
stand in contrast to the findings of pro-cyclical
divorces in recent studies (Chowdury 2013;
Hellerstein and Morrill 2011; Schaller 2012)
using state-level panel data. There are a few
potential reasons for the contrasting results.
First, the previous studies use the current-year
unemployment rates, whereas we use lagged
unemployment rates to take into account the
often lengthy process leading to divorces. We
mentioned earlier how there could be reverse
causality by divorces leading to more unem-
ployed people leaving a state, thereby causing
a reduction in the unemployment rate. Second,
we use individual data, which further avoids
any reverse causality and avoids any bias from
the changing compositions of state populations
or changes in the at-risk population. Finally,
differences in our sample from those in the
previous studies could contribute to the differ-
ences in the results. The samples in the stud-
ies mentioned above cover divorces from all
cohorts that occur in the given years. In con-
trast, our study tracks a nationally representative
cohort of people born between 1957 and 1964,
although their spouses were often born outside
that range.
In the conceptual framework, we discussed
different mechanisms for how the economy
could affect the probability of a divorce. Mech-
anisms contributing to counter-cyclical divorce
rates are weak economies causing financial
strain, which in turn could cause marital ten-
sion due to acrimonious behavior; and a weak
economy causing employment troubles for a
spouse, conveying information on the spouse’s
future earnings potential. Both these repre-
sent changing traits of a spouse. The pri-
mary mechanisms contributing to pro-cyclical
divorce rates are: strong economies causing
marriages to have lower benefits from spe-
cialization (with both spouses more likely to
be working and not as devoted to house-
hold production) and divorces being more
affordable.
How much a couple’s divorce likelihood
is affected by the strength of the economy
would depend on which of these mechanisms
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are stronger and how generally stable the mar-
riage is. As discussed in the “Conceptual Frame-
work” section, the stability of the marriage
could change over time. On one hand, mari-
tal satisfaction could decrease over time, which
could then reduce the stability of the mar-
riage. On the other hand, marriages that sur-
vive a long time are more likely to have an
inherent stability to them. Likewise, invest-
ments in marital-specific capital (e.g., chil-
dren or a house) could help stabilize a mar-
riage in some cases, but might make a cou-
ple more susceptible to financial strain in a
weak economy due to the greater financial
obligations.
We do expect that people in different stages
of marriage would have different baseline haz-
ards of divorce, as shown in Figure 1. One
of the new insights that our study offers is
that, once we account for the underlying over-
all hazard rate, couples in years 6–10 of mar-
riage have counter-cyclical divorce probabilities
while there does not appear to be any effect
for couples at other stages of marriage. Such
results can be due to several factors. First, the
counter-cyclical forces may be stronger for cou-
ples in years 6–10 of marriage relative to the
other couples. Second, the stability of the mar-
riage may be low, as this is the period with
the “7-year itch,” whereas couples who have
been married for 10-or-more years have shown
a staying power (likely through earlier reces-
sions) and may be more stable. Third, couples
in years 6–10 of marriage are more likely, com-
pared to younger couples, to have children and
have a house; thus, it may be that the financial
strain from weak economic periods has a greater
toll on the marriage. Furthermore, a recession
in years 6–10 of marriage may be the first
the couple experiences together, so a loss of
a job may be a stronger signal of future earn-
ings potential than those married for a longer
period.
The main point from this research, however,
is that the current economic crisis is probably
not affecting the stability of marriage for newly
married or long-lasting couples, but the eco-
nomic crisis may be causing more divorces for
couples in years 6–10 of marriage.
APPENDIX: EMPIRICAL MEASUREMENT OF
TIMING BETWEEEN DIVORCE/SEPARATION AND
THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
In this example, the couple got married in October
1992. We set up here the observation on whether they
divorce/separate in the fourth year of marriage (between
10/95 and 10/96). We use the 1-year-lagged unemployment
rate measured as the average unemployment rate in the
third year of marriage (10/94 to 9/95). And, we use the
state of residence as of 10/94 (t-2) to determine the state
unemployment rate.
FIGURE A1
Example of the timing of measuring a divorce/separation
and the unemployment rate
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